Ziegler Macro (Do Not Delete)

4/18/2016 3:30 PM

Perceiving Orientation: Defining Sexuality After Obergefell
MARY ZIEGLER*
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
constitutional jurisprudence will have to more clearly define sexual orientation itself. The
Obergefell majority describes sexuality as binary and suggests that any sexual
orientation is immutable, normal, and constitutive of individual identity. Other scholars
have shown how the kind of binary created by Obergefell excludes those with more fluid
sexual identities and experiences from legal protection.
This Article illuminates new problems with Obergefell’s approach to sexuality by
putting that definition in historical context. While describing sexuality as a matter of
orientation may now seem inevitable, this Article shows that nothing could be further
from the truth. In the 1970s, leading GLBTQ activists considered and rejected the
language of sexual orientation. Instead, movement members battled for civil-rights laws
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual or affectional preference.
The rhetoric of preference gained support for reasons that remain relevant to sexualorientation jurisprudence today. Drawing on the history of debates about sexual
orientation, this Article proposes a definition that protects individuals on the basis of
actual or perceived sexual orientation. A perceived-orientation approach addresses
problems mentioned in leading studies as well as those spotlighted by activists in over
time. First, this strategy will make it harder for discriminators to separate conduct and
status. This approach also protects those who do not fit within established heterosexual or
homosexual categories, but does not depend for its success on the rejection of those
entrenched binaries. Perhaps most importantly, a perceived-orientation approach
promises relief to all victims of orientation-based stereotyping, not only to those who can
prove their “true” status.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges,1 the future of sexual-orientation jurisprudence seems open.2 As the
courts come closer to outlawing sexual-orientation discrimination, constitutional
jurisprudence will have to more clearly define sexual orientation itself. The
Obergefell majority describes sexuality as binary and suggests that sexual
orientation is immutable, normal, and constitutive of individual identity.3 As
scholars from Kenji Yoshino to Elizabeth Glazer have shown, the kind of binary
definition of sexuality articulated by Obergefell promises to exclude those with
more fluid sexual identities and experiences.4
This Article illuminates new problems with Obergefell’s approach to
sexuality by putting that definition in historical context. While describing
sexuality as a matter of orientation may now seem inevitable, this Article shows
that nothing could be further from the truth. In the 1970s, leading GLBTQ
activists considered and rejected the language of sexual orientation.5 Instead,
movement members battled for civil-rights laws banning discrimination on the
basis of sexual or affectional preference.6
The rhetoric of preference gained support for reasons that remain relevant
to sexual-orientation jurisprudence today. Activists in the 1970s worried that
orientation-based categories left open the door for conduct, rather than status-1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. On the future of sexual-orientation discrimination litigation after Obergefell, see Timothy M.
Phelps, Next frontier for gays is employment and housing discrimination, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 7:23
AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gays-employment-20150626-story.html; Lydia DePillis,
This Is the Next Front in the Battle for Gay Rights, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 26, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/26/this-is-the-next-frontier-in-thebattle-for-gay-rights/.
3. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (describing “sexual orientation [as] both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable”). Part III infra further discusses Obergefell’s definition
of sexuality.
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 998–1026 (2012); Kenji
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000); RUTH COLKER,
HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15–38 (1996)
[hereinafter COLKER, HYBRID] (introducing a perspective that “reject[s] conventional bipolar
categories in the areas of gender, race, and disability . . . ”); Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation,
Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1995) [hereinafter Colker, Bi]; Naomi
Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification Based
on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 100–03 (1995).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part I.
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based, discrimination.7 Laws protecting individuals on the basis of status did
nothing to address cases involving either false positives—individuals wrongly
believed to be gay or punished for gender nonconformity—or false negatives—
individuals who could not prove that a discriminator knew about their
orientation.8 Orientation-based categories also threatened to leave out people
who did not fit into the rigid categories defined by law.9
Movement leaders ultimately embraced the orientation-based approach that
is familiar to us because of new legal and political challenges. Confronting an
energetic Religious Right and the AIDS epidemic, movement leaders in the 1980s
recognized underappreciated costs associated with describing sexuality as a
choice.10 At a time when many did not accept anything but heterosexuality as
legitimate, describing sexuality as a choice undermined early calls for
antidiscrimination protections and the repeal of sodomy bans.11
Drawing on the history of debates about sexual orientation, this Article
proposes a definition that protects individuals on the basis of actual or perceived
sexual orientation—one that focuses not only on “true” orientation but on what a
discriminator believes an individual to be. This strategy draws on disability
jurisprudence under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits
discrimination against those regarded as disabled.12 In a variety of doctrinal
areas, including Title VII employment discrimination and equal-protection, a
perceived-orientation approach would address some of the problems tackled by
existing studies. First, orientation-based approaches do not explicitly address
discrimination on the basis of conduct. A photographer refusing to cover a samesex ceremony could claim not to be discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation (orientation-based discrimination) but rather expressing discomfort
with a same-sex couples’ decision to marry (conduct-based discrimination).
However, conduct troubles discriminators partly because of what they believe it
implies about the victim’s status. An approach that recognizes the relationship
between conduct and perceived orientation will make it harder for
discriminators to separate conduct and status.
A perceived-orientation approach also promises a unique degree of
protection to those who do not adhere strictly to the gay-straight binary. To
protect these individuals, other scholars propose antidiscrimination laws that
focus on conduct or that add new categories to cover anyone who falls
somewhere between the gay-straight binary.13 A perceived-orientation strategy
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. On regarded-as theories, see, for example, John M. Vande Walle, Comment, In the Eye of the
Beholder: Issues of Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA’s Employment Protection for Persons
Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 897–905 (1998); Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again:
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory
Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993 (2010); Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and Reasonable
Accommodation of Employees Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fiction?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1495,
1495–532 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 4, at 998–1026; Yoshino, supra note 4, at 353–80; COLKER, HYBRID,
supra note 4, at 15–38.
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may work better than these alternatives. In simply creating new orientation
categories, the law almost inevitably replicates the problem created by the gaystraight binary, leaving out those who do not clearly belong to any of the existing
categories. However, it would be hard to convince courts to reject categories
altogether, particularly given the resonance of a gay-straight binary. A
perceived-orientation strategy avoids both of these problems.
Finally, a perceived-orientation approach addresses the harms tied to
sexual-orientation stereotyping. Strategies focused on “true” conduct or identity
neglect victims targeted for acting queer or violating expected gender norms. By
addressing orientation stereotyping, laws reaching perceived orientation would
offer more robust protection. Moreover, such an approach recognizes that
stigmatizing outsider communities damages not just GLBTQ Americans but also
anyone whose conduct defies standard expectations about sex, gender, and
sexuality.
The argument for a perceived-identity approach proceeds in four parts. Part
I begins tracing the history of debates about the framing of sexuality. This Part
explores the problems activists working in the 1970s identified with the language
of sexual orientation. Part II examines the reasons for the decline of the language
of “sexual or affectional preference.” Part III uses this history to analyze the
definitions of sexuality at work in the Obergefell majority, as well as in the
dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. Part IV evaluates Obergefell’s
definition of sexuality against leading scholarly proposals redefining sexuality.
This Part proposes a perception-based alternative, and Part V concludes.
I. PREFERENCE OR ORIENTATION: THE HISTORY OF FRAMING SEXUALITY
After the 1969 Stonewall riots, the early GLBTQ movement began
developing a reform agenda.14 Members of some organizations, like the Gay
Liberation Front (GLF), urged their colleagues to fight for revolution alongside
other New Left groups, including those advocating for Black Power and
women’s rights.15 Other groups, like the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), the Gay
Rights National Lobby (GRNL), and the National Gay Task Force (later the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force/NGLTF), prioritized a pragmatic, lawreform agenda.16
14. On the history of the early movement, see, for example, ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING
GAY IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEXUALITY IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950-1994, 70–100 (2002); DAVID CARTER,
STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 222–42 (2010); DUDLEY CLENDINEN &
ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
50–62, 83–84 (1999).
15. For an example of GLF’s involvement with other New Left groups, see Will Lissner, New Left
Groups in Session Here, N.Y. TIMES, July. 19, 1970, at 33. For more on the connection between GLF and
the New Left, see JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 233 (2d ed., 1998); ANDREW
HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE CULTURE WARS 32–33 (2015).
16. On the early history of GAA, see, for example, CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at
50–74; CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY AND THE POLITICS OF
VIOLENCE 89–90, 121–22 (2013). On the early history of GRNL, see, for example, TINA FETNER, HOW
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM 48 (2008); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY,
supra note 14, at 263–79. On the early history of NGLTF, see, for example, MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 28–32
(2012); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 196–98.
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Both movement radicals and reformers fought about how best to describe
sexuality to an often-hostile public. GLF members contended, as member Allen
Young put it, that “[g]ay . . . means not homosexual, but sexually free.”17 By
1969, former GLF members started the GAA as a splinter group that would
prioritize antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians over a broad New
Left agenda.18 Notwithstanding its more pragmatic stance, GAA also presented
sexuality partly as a matter of choice.19 Members described a right to sexual
freedom that would protect gays and lesbians: individuals’ “right to control [. . .]
[their] bodies,” “to make love with anyone, anytime, anyway, provided only that
such action be freely chosen.”20
A. The Fight for the Nation’s First Civil Rights Ordinance Sparks Debate
By 1971, when GAA leaders first campaigned for an antidiscrimination
ordinance in New York City, debate about the proposed law forced members to
more clearly explain sexuality to voters and politicians.21 As the GAA stated in a
press release, the proposal, Int. No. 475, “would amend the omnibus Human
Rights Law of New York City by adding the words ‘sexual orientation’ to all
parts of the law which currently outlaw discrimination on the basis of ‘race,
color, creed, national origin, ancestry, or physical handicap.’”22 The proposal did
not entirely abandon the idea that sexuality was freely chosen.23 Indeed, Int. No.
475 defined sexual orientation as “the choice of sexual partner according to
gender.”24
The GAA and its allies on the city council first focused on what seemed to
be the easy issues. Supportive city council members argued that gays and
lesbians already held positions all over the city.25 The threat of discrimination
only made them vulnerable to blackmail.26 Soon, however, the bill stalled, and
GAA members had to reconsider the definition of sexual orientation.27 Over
time, it became clear that supporters of the bill seemed unwilling to protect either

17. Allen Young, Out of the Closets, Into the Streets, in OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY
LIBERATION 28 (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1992).
18. On the founding of GAA, see, for example, ARMSTRONG, supra note 14, at 87; MARC STEIN,
RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 100–10 (2012); SIMON HALL, AMERICAN PATRIOTISM,
AMERICAN PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE SIXTIES 40 (2011).
19. See Preamble to the Constitution and Bylaws of Gay Activists Alliance, Inc. (1971), in SPEAKING
FOR OUR LIVES: HISTORIC SPEECHES AND RHETORIC FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS (1892-2000) 148–50
(Robert B. Ridinger ed., 2012).
20. Id.
21. On the push for the civil-rights law in 1971, see, for example, FETNER, supra note 16, at 36;
HALL, supra note 18, at 44; ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S 236–40 (2013).
22. Pamphlet, Gay Activists Alliance, Civil Rights for Homosexuals (1971) (on file with author
and in the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library).
23. Council Int. No. 475 (N.Y.C. 1971) (on file with author and the Columbia University Rare
Book & Manuscript Library).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Eleanor Blau, Repeal of Laws on Sex Is Urged Here, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1971, at 29.
26. See, e.g., id.
27. On the stalling of the bill, see, for example, Edward Ranzal, Homosexuals Bill Protecting Rights
Is Killed by Council, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1972, at 1.
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public expressions of affection between gay and lesbian couples or gender
nonconformity. Even sympathetic lawmakers seemed reluctant to protect
“transvestites”—defined as those cross-dressing in public—particularly in
situations in which they would interact with minors.28 In 1971, while debate
about the civil-rights ordinance continued, New York removed a ban prohibiting
gays and lesbians from working or congregating in cabarets.29 However, the bill
retained a ban on any “transvestites” entering a cabaret for teenagers.30
As the next several years would make clear, legislators’ persistent
discomfort with “transsexuals” would raise hard questions about the language of
sexual orientation. In January 1972, a committee killed the civil-rights bill,
shocking GAA leaders.31 Some in the legislature blamed the defeat on disgust
with the conduct of those who were openly gay. One lawmaker explained:
“Those who were undecided found [activists’] behavior generally repugnant in
flaunting their gay liberation instead of stressing their civil rights.”32 While some
supporters of the bill favored protection for those with a private, hidden
orientation, they could not stomach the equality demands of those who were
open and unapologetic.
Concern about the distinction between conduct and orientation raged on. In
1972, when New York City Mayor John Lindsay acted to ban discrimination
against GLBTQ workers in the civil service, he outlawed discrimination only on
the basis of “private sexual orientation.”33 In 1973, when several state bar
associations came out in favor of the bill, lawyers leading the groups insisted that
many gays and lesbians did nothing in public that would offend anyone.34 As
bar-association representatives explained: “Much of the resistance to legislation
prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals stems from the belief that all
homosexuals behave in a stereotype[d] fashion which is often identified with
eccentric dress and conduct.”35 Protection against sexual orientation
discrimination seemed likely to do little for gender nonconforming New Yorkers,
GLBTQ radicals, and others whose conduct still offended even those supporting
a civil-rights ordinance.
The conduct-status distinction again took center stage when the civil rights
law finally made it out of committee. “Soberly dressed” proponents of the bill
focused on fairly abstract issues of equality.36 When opponents charged that the
bill would put gays and lesbians in the city’s police force, fire department, and
schools, proponents responded that gay teachers could do nothing to change

28. For examples of the later fixation on “transsexuals,” see, for example, Alfonso A. Narvaez,
City Acts to Let Homosexuals Meet and Work in Cabarets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1972, at 35 (referring to
them as “transvestites”); Edward Ranzal, Bar Groups Back Homosexual Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1973, at
62 [hereinafter Ranzal, Bar Groups]; Edward Ranzal, Homosexual Bill Gains in Council, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
19, 1974, at 1 (referring to transsexuals as “transvestites”).
29. See, e.g., Narvaez, supra note 28, at 35.
30. See, e.g., id.
31. See, e.g., Ranzal, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. New City Directive Bars Hiring Bias on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1972, at 35.
34. See Ranzal, Bar Groups, supra note 28, at 62.
35. Id.
36. Maurice Carroll, City Council’s Bill on Homosexual Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1974, at L70.
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sexual orientation.37 Marc Rubin, an openly gay teacher, asserted: “Most
authorities feel sexual orientation is imprinted by 3 years old and it is so deep
that it is simply not touched by the school.”38
Nevertheless, opponents used the distinction between private orientation
and public conduct to defeat the bill. Whereas GLBTQ activists presented Intro
475 as a modest civil-rights measure, Catholic leaders opposed to the bill argued
that it would legitimize not only private sexual orientation but also public gay
conduct.39 Catholic News, the mouthpiece of the state Catholic conference,
charged that the bill would be “interpreted by many as public license to
uninhibited manifestations of sexual preference.”40 The New York debate helped
to establish orientation as shorthand for private status. While legislators might
support protection for something that a person could not change, opponents of
the bills insisted that the law should leave discrimination on the basis of conduct
untouched.41
When the New York bill failed again, activists across the country considered
alternative definitions of sexuality. Early in 1973, one particularly influential
effort unfolded in Minneapolis-St. Paul.42 Twenty prominent activists met with
sympathetic mental health professionals and attorneys to develop a model civilrights ordinance.43 Some of those present “felt that words like ‘homosexual’ or
‘sexual orientation’ ought to be used” because “‘everybody [knew] what they
mean[t].’”44 Others worried that an orientation-based approach would inevitably
leave many without protection.45 As one attendee explained: “Gay people get
hassled not for what they do in bed, but for publicly expressing their affection—
holding hands, dancingor even for projecting an image which society does not
usually associate with ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ roles.”46
Ultimately, the attendees settled on a definition first proposed by clinical
psychologist Gary Schoener who favored the language of “affectional or sexual
preference.”47 Schoener argued that the language of sexual orientation wrongly
suggested “that you can be put into one box based on your behavior.”48 While
sexual orientation implied that relationships and identities were “static,”
Schoener favored a definition that recognized the fluidity of relationships.49
Attendees also approved of the language of sexual or affectional preference
because it dignified the relationships of GLBTQ couples and highlighted the non37. See, e.g., Gene I. Maeroff, Homosexuals Declare Right to Teach, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1974, at 63.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id.; see also Maurice Carroll, Homosexual Bill Protest Draws Small Crowd Here, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1974, at 49.
40. Carroll, supra note 36, at L70.
41. See, e.g., id.
42. See, e.g., Mailgram from Jack Baker, Chair Person, and Tom Higgins, President, The Gay
Imperitive Inc. to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sept. 26, 1974) [hereinafter Mailgram from
Baker & Higgins] (on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library).
43. See id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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sexual dimensions of those relationships.50
Minnesota activists used the language of sexual or affectional preference in
two radical ways. First, local advocates used preference language to mount the
first major legal demand for marriage equality.51 In a pamphlet called A New Face
for Love, Minnesota activists spotlighted committed same-sex marriage and
demanded constitutional access to marriage.52 Jack Baker, a Minnesota attorney,
later took the argument for marriage equality to court.53 Although the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected Baker’s argument in Baker v. Nelson and the U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed Baker’s appeal for “want of a substantial federal
question,” the Minnesota approach played a central role in efforts to dignify
committed same-sex relationships.54
The Minnesota strategy also explicitly recognized the fluidity of sexuality.
“We all develop a certain capacity for caring for women and men—therefore, we
all possess some degree of Gayness and Straightness,” A New Face for Love
argued.55 “[T]hese two attributes do exist simultaneously.”56 The pamphlet
argued that a preference-based approach would both recognize the fluidity of
sexual attraction and require tolerance for public conduct.57 “The right to live as
we desire includes the right to love out loud—we will no longer accept
mistreatment for loving other people,” A New Face for Love explained.58 “The law
must not sanction discrimination against any person on the basis of ‘affectional
or sexual preference.’”59
After prevailing in the Twin Cities, GLBTQ activists successfully pushed for
city-level referenda in over nine other cities.60 Some cities, like Detroit, developed
laws focused on sexual orientation.61 Other cities used sexual preference as an
alternative framework.62
With two models on offer, activists debated whether orientation and
preference could be used interchangeably and whether one better served the
movement’s goals. At the national level, the orientation-versus-preference debate
defined the work of NGLTF, a group that worked heavily on civil-rights
legislation. The issue of defining sexuality first came to the NGLTF’s attention in
1973, when the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) voted to no longer

50. See id.
51. See, e.g., id. at 1–3; see also Memorandum, A New Face for Love 1–3 (c. 1972) [hereinafter A New
Face for Love] (on file with author and in the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).
52. On Baker’s suit, see, for example, CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 56–57, 71–74;
KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 18–19.
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. For the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, see Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971). For the Supreme Court’s appeal dismissal, see Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
55. A New Face for Love, supra note 51, at 2.
56. Id. at 2.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Judith Cummings, Homosexual-Rights Laws Show Progress in Some Cities, but Drive
Arouses Considerable Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1974, at 17.
61. See, e.g., id.
62. See, e.g., id.
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treat homosexuality as a mental illness.63 NGTF hailed the step as “the greatest
gay victory,” stating that “[t]he diagnosis of homosexuality as an illness has been
the cornerstone of oppression of a tenth of our population.”64
However, in the wake of the APA action, NGLTF members realized that
simply opposing the mental-illness label would not be enough. If homosexuality
was not a sickness, then what was it? Fights about this question had already
begun in the psychiatric community. Therapists generally agreed that having a
gay or lesbian orientation was at least sometimes “dysfunction[al]” but reached
consensus on very little else.65 Led by researchers like Dr. Irving Bieber, an
influential school of experts no longer categorized homosexuality as a mental
illness, but argued that those unhappy with their sexual orientation could easily
change it through therapy.66 In the early 1970s, even the generally sympathetic
New York Times reported that 25 to 50 percent of gays and lesbians could become
straight with proper treatment.67
Other psychiatrists responded not only that sexual orientation was resistant
to change but also that gays and lesbians had no reason to pursue a
transformation.68 These experts argued that at least some gays and lesbians were
healthy and well-adjusted.69 The outcome of this debate was far from clear. A
New York Times headline captured this ambiguity: What We Don’t Know About
Homosexuality; If it Isn’t an Illness, What Is It?70
B. Movement Leaders Argue the Virtues of “Affectional or Sexual Preference”
Initially, members of NGTLF disagreed about how best to answer that
question. Believing that sexuality could not be changed, most of the
organization’s male leaders favored the rhetoric of orientation.71 Women in
NGLTF argued that preference language was more affirming, legitimizing the
very conduct that New York legislators had found unacceptable.72 Ultimately,
leaders of the group decided that preference language better served the
movement’s goals for several reasons.73
First, the language of preference seemed to make a cleaner break with
63. On the APA’s new position, see, for example, Richard D. Lyons, Psychiatrists, in a Shift,
Declare Homosexuality No Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1; Peter Kihss, 8 Psychiatrists Are
Seeking New Vote on Homosexuality as Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1974, at 39.
64. Lyons, supra note 63, at 25.
65. See, e.g., Robert E. Could, What we don’t know about homosexuality; If it isn’t an illness, what is
it?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1973, at 213.
66. For discussion of Bieber’s work, see, for example, id. and Jane E. Brody, More Homosexuals
Aided to Become Heterosexual, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1971, at 1, 47. For a sample of Bieber’s work, see
IRVING BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALS (1962).
67. See Brody, supra note 66, at 1.
68. For a summary of the work of those holding this view, see, for example, Could, supra note
65.
69. See, e.g., id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 265–66; see also HEATHER MURRAY, NOT
IN THIS FAMILY: GAYS AND THE MEANING OF KINSHIP IN POSTWAR NORTH AMERICA 64–65, 81–82, 107–
19, 179 (2012).
72. See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 265–66.
73. See, e.g., id.
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arguments about dysfunction and mental illness still circulating in the
psychiatric community. Avoiding stigma mattered particularly to lesbian
feminists, many of whom had long used the language of sexual preference to
fend off attacks by other members of the women’s liberation movement.74 In the
early 1970s, when the National Organization for Women (NOW) first considered
the issue of lesbian rights, veteran feminists like Betty Friedan opposed the
idea.75 Friedan and her allies argued that the idea of lesbian rights would be used
to discredit the entire women’s movement.76
Feminists like Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem responded that lesbian
rights were central to all women’s liberation insofar as lesbians rejected the
phallocentric, male-dominated hierarchy that had subordinated women.77 Using
the language of preference allowed advocates like Morgan to present same-sex
attraction as a legitimate, if not superior, alternative.78 As late as 1980, NOW
defined lesbians as women who had a “primary psychological, emotional, social,
and sexual preference for other women.”79 As lesbian feminists recognized,
presenting sexuality as a matter of choice more directly challenged the stigma
surrounding gay and lesbian sex. Rather than avoiding any discussion of the
desirability of gay and lesbian relationships, the rhetoric of preference suggested
that Americans could reasonably—and beneficially—choose same-sex
relationships.
Moreover, movement leaders believed that preference language promised
broader protection than did the rhetoric of orientation. As the New York
experience indicated, some lawmakers facing orientation bans still claimed the
authority to discriminate on the basis of conduct.80 In other cities, the conductorientation distinction posed a similar risk. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, when
prosecutors pursued a lesbian couple observed dancing at a night club, local
prosecutors denied that they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.81
Assistant District Attorney Edward Pear explained: “It was our feeling that it
was their conduct that was unacceptable.”82
Sometimes, movement leaders also hoped that sexual-preference laws
would protect those targeted because of gender non-conformity.83 In 1974, when
74. On lesbian feminists’ use of the language of sexual preference, see, for example, MURRAY,
supra note 71, at 81–82; WINIFRED BREINES, THE TROUBLE BETWEEN US: AN UNEASY HISTORY OF WHITE
AND BLACK WOMEN IN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 104–105 (2006). For contemporary uses, see Judy
Klemesrud, The Lesbian Issue and Women’s Lib, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1970, at 60; Robin Morgan, The
Media and Male Chauvinism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1970, at 33.
75. On the history of anti-lesbian rhetoric in NOW, see, for example, KARLA JAY, TALES OF THE
LAVENDER MENACE: A MEMOIR OF LIBERATION 137–47 (2000); NANCY F. COTT, NO SMALL COURAGE: A
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 561 (2004); SARA EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: HOW WOMEN
CHANGED AMERICA AT CENTURY’S END 51–52, 102, 122 (2010).
76. See, e.g., id. at 51–52; COTT, supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 71, at 81–82.
78. See, e.g., id.
79. Pamphlet, Boston National Organization for Women, “Lesbians: A Consciousness-Raising
Perspective” (1980) (on file with the author).
80. See supra Part I.
81. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 60, at 17.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Madeleine Janover, Colorado Women, OFF OUR BACKS, May 31, 1974, at 12.
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Boulder, Colorado, considered a civil-rights ordinance, a sociologist testifying in
favor of the measure implied that the reform would help anyone targeted on the
basis of orientation-based stereotyping.84
NGLTF leaders promoted city ordinances as a way of building support for
an amendment to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would protect gays
and lesbians.85 In 1974, Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY) introduced a bill
amending Title VII to protect against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual
orientation, or marital status.86 Minnesota activists urged Abzug to change the
bill to cover “sexual or affectional preference.”87 Jack Baker contacted Abzug and
argued strongly for a preference-based approach, explaining: “The way [that the]
media interprets legal semantics eventually shapes public attitude[s] and can go
far in showing that gayness implies much more than sexual conduct.”88 “Please
amend your bill to recognize that physical intimacy is only one albeit important
part of human affections,” argued Michael McConnell, another Minnesota
advocate.89 “Holding hands and other public expressions of [a]ffection costs
more jobs than private sexual behavior.”90
NGLTF leader Bruce Voeller travelled to Washington, DC to ask Abzug to
change the bill’s language.91 Voeller “very strong[ly]” urged Abzug to frame
sexuality as a matter of “affectional [or sexual] preference.”92 In explaining his
reasoning, he emphasized that sexual-orientation protections left some without
protection.93 He cited a case from Minneapolis-St. Paul in which police officers
had harassed a couple for holding hands.94 Because these men were targeted
because of their conduct, Voeller argued, “under the phrase ‘sexual orientation’
it would not be clear that they would be protected from harassment.”95 The bill
failed to make it out of committee, but Voeller and NGLTF asked that it be
reintroduced in December.96 This time, the bill focused exclusively on sexualpreference discrimination, but it fared no better in Congress.97
84.
85.
86.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 60, at 17.
See, e.g., HANHARDT, supra note 16, at 165; SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT: GAY
RIGHTS LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (2007); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION
319 (2009).
87. See, e.g., Mailgram from Baker & Higgins, supra note 42; Mailgram from Michael McConnell
to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sep. 26, 1974) [hereinafter Mailgram from McConnell] (on file
with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).
88. Mailgram from Baker & Higgins, supra note 42.
89. Mailgram from McConnell, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Marilyn to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sep. 24, 1974)
(on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Marilyn]..
92. Id. See also Memorandum from Jay to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Dec. 4, 1974) (on
file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).
93. See Memorandum from Marilyn, supra note 91, at 1–2.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. Id.
96. See Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1–2.
97. On Abzug’s reframing of the bill, see, for example, Letter from Bella Abzug, U.S.
Congresswoman, to Stephen L. Rosenquist, Instructor in Classics, Sw. Mo. State Univ. (Feb. 6, 1975)
(on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library) (describing a
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In spite of these setbacks, NGLTF continued describing sexuality as a matter
of preference. In 1975, when the group invested more in litigation, a preferencebased strategy seemed to fit better with the substantive due process arguments
stressed in court.98 Shortly after the Roe v. Wade decision, Bruce Voeller and gayrights attorneys met privately with Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.99
Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, invalidated the vast majority of
abortion laws on the books, recognizing a right to privacy broad enough to cover
a woman’s abortion decision.100 Activists took heart from Roe, and Douglas
predicted that NGLTF could successfully challenge sodomy bans in the Supreme
Court.101 NGLTF members soon took him up on the idea.102 In Doe v.
Commonwealth’s Attorney, NGLTF worked with ACLU board member Philip
Hirschkop, a prominent attorney known for his work on Loving v. Virginia,103 to
organize a class action challenging Virginia’s sodomy ban, and Voeller’s lover
served as one of the plaintiffs.104 On appeal, Hirschkop focused on arguments
that the right to privacy recognized in Roe and its progeny protected the sexual
behavior of consenting adults.105 At the same time, Marilyn Haft of the ACLU
Sexual Privacy Project litigated her own challenge to sodomy bans in Enslin v.
North
Carolina.106
Although they lost in the lower courts, Hirschkop convinced one judge that
the privacy right recognized in Roe extended to a “mature individual’s choice of
an adult sexual partner.”107 When Hirschkop appealed, Haft also asked the Court
to grant certiorari in Enslin, and NGTF filed an amicus curiae brief.108 However,
the Court refused to hear Enslin and affirmed the lower court’s decision in Doe
without issuing an opinion.109 NGLTF immediately issued a press release
condemning the Court for “its insensitivity to the right to privacy of all
Americans.”110
preference-based bill as a “more effective mechanism” for protecting gay rights). On the failure of
Abzug’s bill, see, for example, SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES 45 (2007); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 131 (2009).
98. See supra Part I.
99. See, e.g., JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANDADA 71–72 (2005).
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-51 (1973); Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
101. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 105
(2009).
102. See, e.g., PIERCESON, supra note 99, at 71–72.
103. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving struck down anti-miscegenation laws. See id.
104. See, e.g., PIERCESON, supra note 99.
105. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA,
1861-2003 185–86 (2008); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY ix (2012).
106. 217 S.E. 2d 669 (N.C. 1975). On the litigation of Enslin, see, for example, ESKRIDGE, supra note
105, at 187–90.
107. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203–05 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige J.,
dissenting).
108. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 185–86.
109. For the Court’s decision, see Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 985
(1976). The Court denied certiorari in Enslin. See Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
110. Robert D. McFadden, Homosexuals and A.C.L.U. Dismayed by Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1976, at 17.
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Hoping for backlash to the Court’s ruling, Voeller and his co-director Jean
O’Leary attacked Doe in the New York Times.111 They argued that by not
protecting private sexual preferences, the Court threatened both straight and gay
Americans.112 They asserted that previously, “the right to one’s own body and
the right to the privacy of one’s own home have been vigorously protected by the
Court.”113 According to Voeller and O’Leary, Doe “compromise[d] the Court’s
earlier [privacy] decisions and should raise great fears.”114
As the press release indicated, sexual-preference arguments continued to
figure in NGLTF’s efforts to build allies outside of the GLBTQ community.
O’Leary used similar reasoning in endorsing the decriminalization of
prostitution.115 “When you talk about sex preference,” she explained, “you must
include all women, prostitutes or lesbians.”116 NGLTF also presented sexuality as
a matter of preference in 1976 when lobbying the Democratic Party for
support.117 “Millions of women and men in this country are subject to severe
social, economic, psychological, and legal oppression because of their sexual
preference,” the platform proposal stated.118 “We affirm the right of all persons
to define and express their own sensibility, emotionality, and sexuality and
choose their own lifestyle, so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of
others.”119 In 1977, when Representative Ed Koch (D-NY) again introduced a
gay-rights amendment to Title VII, activists in the NGLTF and an allied
organization, the Gay Rights National Lobby (GRNL), continued to depend on
the language of “affectional or sexual preference.”120
For much of the 1970s, leading GLBTQ reformers defined sexuality as a
matter of preference rather than orientation. After some dispute, the leaders of
state and national organizations promoted statutes that used a similar definition.
Using the language of preference appealed to lesbians actively combatting the
stigma surrounding same-sex attraction. As NGLTF members concluded, the
rhetoric of preference seemed to offer more protection, because when cities
prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination, public and private actors claimed
the right to target GLBTQ individuals because of conduct or gender nonconformity.
In the later 1970s, however, leaders of groups like NGLTF began to question
the wisdom of a preference-based definition. After the mobilization of the
111. See Jean O'Leary and Bruce Voeller, Implications of the Supreme Court Decision on Sodomy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1976, at 20.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Lesbians Offer Support for Hookers, THE CHILDRESS INDEX, Nov. 22, 1976, at 5.
116. Id.
117. See National Gay Task Force Recommendations for the 1976 Democratic Party Platform
(1976) [hereinafter National Gay Task Force Recommendations] (on file with author and the
Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library); see also Bruce Voeller, Exec. Dir., National
Gay Task Force, to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (May 3, 1976) (on file with author and the
Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).
118. National Gay Task Force Recommendations, supra note 117, at 1.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Joe Totten to GRNL Board, Status of Gay Rights Legislation (Dec. 9, 1977) (on file
with author and the Cornell University Library).
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Religious Right,121 a loose coalition of organizations angry about recent legal and
cultural changes involving gender roles, school prayer, and abortion, social
conservatives coopted arguments that sexuality was a choice. In campaigning to
defeat or repeal local civil-rights ordinances, activists argued that gays and
lesbians needed behavior modification, not protection from discrimination. At
the same time, anti-gay activists exploited arguments about the fluidity of
sexuality. While repeating arguments conflating pedophilia and homosexuality,
Religious Right leaders also insinuated that children close to gays and lesbians
would change their sexual orientation.
Facing a new challenge from the Right, activists in groups like NGLTF
reconsidered the value of defining sexuality as a matter of choice. Over the
course of the late 1970s, activists again began describing sexuality in terms of
orientation.
II. BACKLASH AND THE RISE OF AN ORIENTATION-BASED FRAMEWORK
Religious Right leaders began exploiting preference-based definitions after a
setback in Miami in 1977.122 After local leaders passed a civil-rights ordinance,
Anita Bryant, a former beauty queen and gospel recording artist, founded a
group dedicated to repealing the ordinance.123 Calling her group Save Our
Children, Bryant implied that predatory gay men threatened families.124 Bryant
and her allies first argued that civil-rights ordinances would simply allow gays
to convert children to a deviant lifestyle.125 As Bryant told the New York Times in
March 1977: “What these people really want [. . .] is the legal right to propose to
our children that there is an acceptable alternative way of life—that being a
homosexual or lesbian is not really wrong.”126 Bryant’s arguments appeared to

121. First coined by the media, the term describes a loose coalition of socially conservative,
generally (although not uniformly) Christian organizations that first took shape in the late 1970s to
transform law and policy on issues including abortion, sex discrimination, school prayer, and gay
rights. See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 160–
169 (2010) (explaining the origins of the term “religious right” and the coalition’s early work); J.
BROOKS FLIPPEN, JIMMY CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY, AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
14–20 (2011) (describing debates about the definition of the Religious Right); David W. Moore, The
“Religious Right”: Definition and Measurement, THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, Apr.–May 1995,
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/63/63011.pdf.
122. See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 296; PHIL TIEMEYER, PLANE QUEER:
LABOR, SEXUALITY, AND AIDS IN THE HISTORY OF MALE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 131 (2013); WILLIAMS,
supra note 121, at 109, 147–51.
123. On the founding of Save Our Children, see, for example, MICHAEL STEWART FOLEY, FRONT
PORCH POLITICS: THE FORGOTTEN HEYDAY OF AMERICAN ACTIVISM IN THE 1970S AND 1980S 88 (2013);
CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 127 (2002); WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 109.
124. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 123, at 88; RIMMERMAN, supra note 123, at 127; WILLIAMS, supra
note 121, at 109.
125. See, e.g., Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1977, at
56; B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Miami Debate Over Rights of Homosexuals Directs Wide Attention to a
National Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1977, at 18.
126. Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals, supra note 125, at 56. For more on the
work of Save Our Children, see, for example, JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER
SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 143 (2002); JEFFREY D. HOWISON, THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION: RONALD REAGAN AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 84
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resonate; Miami residents voted against the ordinance by a two-to-one margin.127
Pleased by the publicity Bryant brought to the issue of anti-GLBTQ
discrimination, NGLTF and its allies publicly argued that Bryant was “the best
thing that happened to gays.”128 To some extent, these arguments reflected the
reality. For NGLTF, for example, the Bryant campaign apparently increased
NGTF’s membership, fundraising, and volunteers by a factor of five.129
Internally, however, NGLTF members worried that Bryant had exposed the
weaknesses of the organization’s existing strategy.130 At a strategy meeting,
NGLTF member Charles Brydon spoke up in favor of arguments based on
preference and choice, suggesting that they connected the cause to policies
favored by progressive movements.131 Brydon reminded those present that
“abortion [was] also a choice.”132 Voeller initially agreed that a preference or
choice-based strategy spoke to deeply-held American values, including the
“strength of diversity.”133
However, board members, Voeller among them, identified serious costs
associated with describing sexuality as a matter of preference.134 At a minimum,
Voeller suggested that NGTF “pull away from ‘right to choose’ [arguments] in
the short term.”135 The Anita Bryant controversy had exposed some of the risks
posed by a preference-based definition. If Bryant stoked fears about the spread of
homosexuality, choice arguments could only exacerbate the problem.136 “‘Right
of Choice’ is not a rallying point,” one board member reasoned. “People have a
right to try to prevent children from being homosexual.”137
As an emerging Religious Right and New Right coalition attacked other
civil-rights ordinances, NGLTF leaders had more reason to question preferencebased arguments.
Led by activists like Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich, the New Right
mobilized conservatives angry at the Republican establishment.138 Weyrich and
his allies promised a political insurrection, led by “radical[s] committed to
sweeping changes.”139
(2014).
127. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Miami Votes 2 to 1 to Repeal Law Barring Bias Against
Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 1977, at 1.
128. Id.; see also B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Miami Vote Increases Activism on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 9, 1977, at 1; Homosexuals March for Equal Rights, N. Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1977, at 1.
129. See NGLTF Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (Jul. 11, 1977) (on file with author and in the
Harvard University Schlesinger Library).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 4–5.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980 162 (2010); MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 12 (2015).
139. WILLIAM C. MARTIN, WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN AMERICA
135 (2005). For more on the motivations of major players in the New Right, see WILLIAMS, supra note
121, at 167–70; DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE
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As New Right leaders sought to take out congressional liberals, activists like
Viguerie and Weyrich identified issues like gay rights as a way of mobilizing
previously disengaged conservative evangelical Protestants.140 Between 1978 and
1979, prominent evangelicals founded organizations to advance their interests,
including Christian Voice (1978) and the Moral Majority (1979).141
Linking opposition to abortion and gay rights, leaders of the New Right and
Religious Right described both as bad choice.142 During the fight for an Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution, Phyllis Schlafly, the most
prominent opponent of the ERA, told her supporters that the amendment would
entrench abortion and “give homosexuals all the rights of husbands and
wives.”143 In either case, Schlafly claimed that ERA proponents used the
language of a right to choose to camouflage their true desires.144 Choice was “the
code word for abortion,” she alleged, “much as ‘different lifestyles’ [is] the code
word for homosexuality.”145
Using similar arguments, anti-gay leaders in the Religious Right and New
Right expanded their campaign for the repeal of local civil-rights ordinances.146
In St. Paul, Minnesota, Reverend Richard Angwin, a fundamentalist preacher
from Kansas, headed the repeal campaign.147 Angwin used the idea of sexual
preference to argue for repeal.148 “[B]eing a pervert is like being a thief,” Angwin
explained.149 “[B]oth are wrong and both can continue or repent.”150 Angwin’s
supporters carried the day. St. Paul voted to repeal its ordinance by a vote of
54,046 to 31, 694.151
POLITICAL HISTORY 127–35 (2007); WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE
180–95 (2008).
140. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 121 at 169–171; LYDIA BEAN, THE POLITICS OF EVANGELICAL
IDENTITY: LOCAL CHURCHES AND PARTISAN DIVIDES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 32 (2014);
KALMAN, supra note 138 at 162.
141. On the early years of Christian Voice, see, for example, DEAL WYATT HUDSON, ONWARD,
CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS: THE GROWING POLITICAL POWER OF CATHOLICS AND EVANGELICALS IN THE
UNITED STATES 6–10, 56 (2008); ELIZABETH ANNE OLDMIXON, UNCOMPROMISING POSITIONS: GOD, SEX,
AND THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 95 (2005); Paul Boyer, The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s
American Protestantism, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 45
(Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008). On the founding of the Moral Majority, see
HUDSON, supra, at 15; KALMAN, supra note 138, at 274; WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 171, 174–75.
142. See, e.g., The Hypocrisy of ERA Proponents, THE SCHLAFLY REPORT, Jun. 1975, vol. 8, no.12, sec.
2 (on file with author and in the Harvard University Schlesinger Library).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id. For more on Schlafly’s anti-gay rhetoric, see, for example, DONALD T. CRITCHLOW,
PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S CRUSADE 225–29 (2005); HUDSON,
supra note 141, at 64; DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A
SHORT HISTORY 155 (2005).
146. See infra Part II.
147. See, e.g., Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., After Repeal of Homosexual Bias Law, St. Paul Debates the
Implications, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1978, at A20.
148. See, e.g., id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. For more on the St. Paul campaign, see Nathaniel Sheppard, Law on Homosexuals Repealed
in St. Paul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1978, at A1. For more on Angwin’s campaign, see CLENDINEN &
NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 326.
OF MODERN CONSERVATISM
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Religious Right groups mounted signature petition drives in Wichita,
Kansas, and Eugene, Oregon.152 In both cities, local pastors argued that
homosexuality was an illegitimate preference.153 Reverend Ron Adrian, the head
of Concerned Citizens for Community Decency in Wichita, rejected the idea that
the ordinance had anything to do with civil rights.154 “We think it’s an effort on
the part of a small group of people to ask us to approve their immoral lifestyle,”
Adrian asserted.155 Rosalie Butler, a sympathizer of the Religious Right and a
member of the St. Paul City Council, backed Adrian’s assessment.156 “Those who
choose a perverted lifestyle, whether it’s a homosexual [or] a robber, can’t expect
the full rights [. . .] that people who live in step with society get,” she
explained.157
Arguments about immoral preferences apparently spoke to voters in
Wichita and Eugene. On May 10, Reverend Adrian celebrated a huge margin of
victory in Wichita, with voters repealing the city’s ordinance by a margin of
29,402 to 6,153.158 Barely more than two weeks later, a partial tally in Eugene
showed that 13,838 voters preferred repeal, with only 7,685 in opposition.159 In
the wake of the defeats, the media described a bleak future for supporters of gay
and lesbian rights. As the New York Times put it: “[I]t seems likely that few
supporters of homosexual rights support them as vigorously as opponents
oppose them.”160
A. NGLTF Reconsiders Preference-Based Definitions
Between 1978 and 1980, NGLTF leaders worried that preference-based
definitions had done more harm than good, and organizational leaders began
developing an alternative. Lesbian Tide, a movement publication, put out an
article highlighting NGLTF’s use of an orientation-based definition.161 The article
accused NGLTF of “calling for an end to choice.”162 Instead of refuting this
charge, NGLTF leaders sent a letter “clarifying its position and [. . .] reiterating
that sexual orientation and sexual preference are both useful terms to different
segments of the community.”163
152. See, e.g., Sheppard, Jr., supra note 147, at 27; see also Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1978, at A18; Grace Lichtenstein, Laws Aiding Homosexuals Face Rising Opposition
Around Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1978, at A1.
153. See infra Part II.
154. See Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. See Sheppard, Jr., supra note 147, at 27.
157. Id.
158. See Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, supra note 152.
159. See, e.g., Wallace Turner, Voters in Eugene, Ore., Repeal Ordinance on Homosexual Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1978, at A18.
160. Voters Reject Homosexual Rights But Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1978, at E16.
161. See, e.g., NGLTF Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (Feb. 11-12, 1978), 14 (on file with
author and the Cornell University Library). For the article, see Feminist, Gay Leaders Call for an End to
‘Choice’? LESBIAN TIDE, Sep.-Oct. 1977, at 21.
162. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
163. NGLTF Executive Committee Meeting Minutes (Jun. 1978) (on file with author and the
Cornell University Library) [hereinafter June NGLTF Meeting Minutes]; NGLTF Executive
Committee Meeting Minutes (Aug. 3, 1980) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library).
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In part, the organization’s use of orientation rhetoric reflected fresh
skepticism about trying to build common ground with liberal groups also
challenging morals regulations.164 At a June NGLTF meeting discussing the
referenda, movement leaders questioned whether liberals “were really with [the
movement].”165 “The liberals’ support is not nearly as strong as many say it is,”
one activist asserted.166 “As [. . .] the right wing’s power grows[,] panic will set
in. The liberals will try to save themselves by remaining silent on issues that
don’t affect them directly.”167
In August 1978, the NGLTF Executive Committee again discussed “how to
deal with the upcoming referenda and, in general, with the ‘new right wing.’”168
Many present felt that potential progressive partners “did not want to deal with
the gay issue, even though the groups battling gay rights were also battling other
liberal causes”169
Contemporary politics stoked these fears. The New York Times, the bible of
many left-leaning groups, favored protections for gay and lesbian teachers only
because there was no proof that they could change a child’s sexual orientation,
explaining: “The desire for parents for reassurance that their children will not be
somehow ‘converted’ to homosexuality at school is understandable.”170 In 1983,
members of NOW and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund publicly
argued that “sexual preference should be protected by the right to privacy” but
insisted that the ERA “would not legitimate same-sex marriages.”171
As the AIDS epidemic hit the GLBTQ community, sexual-preference
arguments became even more of a liability. Exploiting uncertainty about the
transmission of the disease, anti-gay activists described AIDS as a disease
resulting from a selfish lifestyle preference. In fighting for funding for AIDS
research, confidentiality for AIDS victims, and antidiscrimination protections,
GLBTQ activists responded that sexual orientation was not a preference and
could not be changed.
B. The AIDS Crisis Creates New Reason to Reframe Sexuality
In 1981, the New York Times reported on a handful of cases of a rare illness
that disproportionately affected gay men.172 Between 1982 and 1983, the number
of patients with AIDS nearly tripled.173 Panic followed the spread of the disease.
164. See June NGLTF Meeting Minutes, supra note 163, at 6.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. August NGLTF Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, supra note 163, at 4.
169. Id.
170. The Homosexual in the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1977, at 28.
171. Letter from Marsha Levick, Legal Director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
to Staff (1983) (on file with author and the Harvard University Schlesinger Library). For a sample of
similar arguments made by ERAmerica, see Homosexual Marriage: Not True, ERAMERICA NEWSLETTER
(1978) (on file with University of Missouri-St. Louis); COMMON CAUSE, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: A REPORT ON THE 27TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1979) (on file with
University of Missouri-St. Louis).
172. See, e.g., 2 Fatal Diseases Focus of Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1981, at 1.
173. On the rapid spread of the disease, see, for example, AIDS: A New Disease’s Deadly Odyssey,
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In 1983, the media ran stories suggesting that people infected with the disease
could transmit it by casual contact.174
The federal government responded slowly, forcing local GLBTQ groups to
pick up the slack.175 Even when Congress appropriated money for AIDS research
for the first time in 1983, President Reagan threatened to veto a bill that would
have dedicated only $12 million for addressing the epidemic.176
Beyond governmental neglect, examples of discrimination against gays and
lesbians proliferated. Conservative writer William Buckley proposed that people
with AIDS be tattooed so that others could easily avoid them.177 In 1985,
Congressman William Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed a series of bills that would
make it a felony for any person with AIDS to give blood, deny federal funds to
cities that did not close down gay bathhouses, and prohibit persons with AIDS
from either working in the health care industry or attending public schools.178
Even cosmopolitan cities like New York and San Francisco shuttered bath houses
rather than focusing on education about safe sex.179
Religious Right activists used the idea of sexual preference to justify antigay bias. In testifying before Congress, Reverend Charles McIlhenny, a
California-based anti-gay activist, argued that “homosexuality [was] not caused
by a constitutional, glandular, hormonal, or genetic factor” but rather “a learned
behavior.”180 If gays and lesbians made a voluntary choice, McIlhenny argued,
they could not be true victims of discrimination. “Granting special legislation to
a group because of behavior—let alone immoral behavior—opens the floodgates
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1983, at A6.
174. For discussion of the theory that AIDS spread by casual contact, see, for example, Bob
Nelson, “Casual Contact” Theories Incite AIDS Panic, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 18, 1983, at 3;
Dudley Clendinen, AIDS Spreads Pain and Fear Among Ill and Healthy Alike, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17, 1983 at
A1; Larry Goldsmith, New Studies Further Speculation on AIDS, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, May 21, 1983,
at 3.
175. On the slow and incomplete federal response, see, for example, RIMMERMAN, supra note 123,
at 89; DEBORAH B. GOULD, MOVING POLITICS: EMOTION AND ACT UP’S FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 92 (2009);
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 154, 324–30
(2007). RE Note: I think the author cited to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition, hence I corrected the
Staff Editors’ deletion here.
176. On Reagan’s veto threat, see, for example, Bob Nelson, AIDS Funding Jeopardized by Veto
Threat, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 25, 1983, at 3; Sue Hyde, Task Force to Meet with Presidential Aide,
GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 18, 1983, at 1.
177. See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., Opinion and Editorial, Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS
Epidemic; Identify All Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1986, at A27.
178. On Dannemeyer’s proposals, see E. R. Shipp, Concern Over Sp[re]ad of AIDS Generates a Spate
of New Laws Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1; Marlene Cimons, AIDS Workplace Guidelines
Win Praise But Dannemeyer Vows to Continue Fight to Restrict Victims’ Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1985, at
6; Dannemeyer Outlines His View on AIDS, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Dannemeyer
Outlines His View].
179. On the bathhouse regulations, see Marilyn Chase, Doctors’ Efforts to Control AIDS Spark
Battles Over Civil Liberties, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 23; N.Y. Bans Sexual Activities Tied to AIDS
Bathhouses, Other Establishments Face Closure for Violations, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 12; Kevin
Roderick & Marlene Cimons, U.S., County Support Curbs on Bathhouses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1985, at
A1.
180. Hearing on the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981 Before the Subcommittee on Employment
Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong. 32 (1982) (statement of Rev.
Charles McIlhenny).
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to any group that wants minority status,” he concluded.181
At the national level, Religious Right figures echoed this reasoning. In
opposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, Connie Marshner, a close ally of
Weyrich’s, contended that privacy rights militated against protections for gays
and lesbians.182 “What we are advocating,” she explained, “is that our right to
privacy be respected: That the homosexual lifestyle not be flaunted in our
neighborhoods and shouted from the housetops.”183 The opposition made
sexual-preference arguments shorthand for the libertinism and selfishness of
which Religious Right activists accused gay men.184
The politics of AIDS reinforced social conservatives’ effort to equate
selfishness and sexual preference. Judy Welton of Parents United Because
Legislators Ignore Children (PUBLIC), a group that campaigned for the
expulsion of infected children from public schools, argued against increased
funding for research, public education, or drug trials related to AIDS.185 Framing
sexuality as a mere preference, Welton argued that gay men and lesbians put
their wellbeing above everyone else’s.186 “What kind of compassion,” she asked,
“allows a disease such as AIDS to go on, knowing the causes are selfish, immoral
behavior patterns that affect all of us?”187
Dannemeyer, one of the most visible anti-gay leaders, happily discussed the
idea of sexual preference.188 In response to accusations of bigotry, Dannemeyer
wrote to the Los Angeles Times: “Whether the public health response to AIDS
should be compromised because of the perceived sensitivities of the male
homosexual community, or whether gay rights should be given ‘equal
treatment,’ comes down to basic value choices in a free society.I speak for those
who favor traditional family values.”189
Leaders of the NGLTF responded that sexual-orientation discrimination, not
sexual preference discrimination, was the real issue. Virginia Apuzzo, the new
leader of NGLTF, described AIDS as a “public health crisis [that] has struck
minorities who have traditionally been the victims of officially sanctioned
discrimination.”190 As Jeff Levi, Apuzzo’s replacement at NGLTF, later
explained: “Hiding behind a false mask of concern about public health, there
have been efforts to use the fear of AIDS to oppose or repeal civil rights
protections for gay men and lesbians.”191 NGLTF leaders also attributed
181. Id.
182. See id. at 40–41 (statement of Connaught Marshner).
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See AIDS Issues Part II: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 683–84 (1987) (statement of Patricia Welton).
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. See Dannemeyer Outlines His View, supra note 178, at 5.
189. Id.
190. Federal Response to AIDS: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and
Human Resources of the House Committee on Governmental Relations, 98th Cong. 24 (1983) (statement of
Virginia Apuzzo).
191. Federal and Local Government’s Response to the AIDS Epidemic: Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Intergovenmental Relations and Human Relations of the House Committee on Human
Resources, 99th Cong.237–38 (1985) (statement of Jeff Levi).
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governmental indifference to anti-gay bias. As Apuzzo stated, “The failure of
government to recognize and deal with the health issues facing gays and lesbians
is a reflection of the oppression we face in American society .”192
Concerned about the advances of the Religious Right and blowback from
the AIDS crisis, members of NGLTF and GRNL began defining sexuality as an
unchangeable orientation rather than a matter of preference. In renewing the
push for federal civil-rights legislation, GRNL created a public education
campaign to “analyze barriers in public thinking to the enactment of effective
public policy measures ending discrimination based on sexual orientation” and
“[t]o educate the public on the nature of homosexuality.”193 Recognizing the
downsides of sexual-preference arguments, members of the group planned to
“counter” special-preference claims.194 To do so, GRNL almost exclusively used
the language of orientation. “Our goal,” the group stated, “[is] equal justice
under the law regardless of sexual orientation.”195 In testifying in favor of an
amendment to Title VII, Jean O’Leary, then a member of GRNL, also insisted
civil-rights protections were not “designed to approve a lifestyle or create a
special minority—but simply to prohibit discrimination [. . .] based on sexual
orientation.”196
NGLTF also cast aside sexual-preference rhetoric. In lobbying inside and
outside of Congress, the organization convinced the Mayors’ Conference to
“[r]ecogniz[e] the right of all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation, to full
participation in American society.”197 AIDS and the discrimination it unleashed
bolstered arguments about sexual-orientation discrimination. As NGLTF argued
in the period, “90% of lesbians and gay men have been victimized at some point
in their lives solely because of their sexual orientation.”198
C. Orientation, Suspect Classification, and the Courts
As GLBTQ activists renewed the push for protection in the Supreme Court,
192. Press Release, National Gay Task Force, Gay/Lesbian Community to Discuss Health Issues
with Reagan Administration (June 12, 1983) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library).
193. Press Release, Gay Rights National Lobby, Gay Rights National Lobby Creates Education
and Research Foundation (Nov. 22, 1981) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library); see
also Memorandum, Rick Davis, Education and Research Director, Right to Privacy Foundation, on
Sharing Right to Privacy Goals and Objectives with leaders of other community organizations to
Steve Endean, President, Right to Privacy Foundation 1–4 (1983) [hereinafter Davis to Endean] (on
file with author and the Cornell University Library).
194. Davis to Endean, supra note 193, at 2.
195. Proposal, Gay Rights National Lobby, Grant Proposal to Playboy Foundation (Feb. 15, 1983)
(on file with author and the Cornell University Library).
196. Hearing on the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981 Before the Subcommittee on Employment
Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jean
O’Leary). For more on the strategy behind amending the Civil Rights Act, see JOHN-MANUEL
ANDRIOTE, VICTORY DEFERRED: HOW AIDS CHANGED GAY LIFE IN AMERICA 222 (1999); MARGOT
CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 262
(2009); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 240–42, 258.
197. “Mayors’ Conference Favors Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights” (Jan. 27, 1984) (on file with
author and the Cornell University Library).
198. Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, National Gay Task Force Position
Statements on AIDS-Related Issues (Apr. 14, 1985) (on file with author and the Cornell University
Library).
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activists identified another reason for using the language of sexual orientation.
As the movement explored arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, it became more important to describe sexual identities and
behaviors as unchangeable. The political and legal justifications for using the
rhetoric of sexual orientation aligned.
In the 1980s, when movement attorneys focused on a challenge to sodomy
regulations, attorneys for organizations like NGLTF and Lambda often
prioritized substantive due process arguments based on the right to privacy.199
These arguments took center stage in Bowers v. Hardwick,200 when activists
challenged the constitutionality of sodomy bans. Acting as amicus curiae, the
National Lesbian Rights Project and allied groups argued: “[T]he right
of privacy, as derived from the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, readily and
reasonably includes the right of an adult person of whatever sexual orientation
(to wit., [sic] whether heterosexual, bisexual, gay or lesbian) to choose to engage
in physically private, consenting, non-violent sexual activities with another adult
person.”201 Those challenging the law relied on cases like Roe v. Wade,202 arguing
that the Court had mandated “heightened scrutiny not of state restrictions on
procreative sex, but rather of restrictions on non-procreative sex—sex solely as a
facet of associational intimacy—whether between married partners or between
unmarried individuals.”203 In 1986, the Bowers Court flatly rejected these
claims.204 The majority stated bluntly: “[T]o claim that a right to engage in
[sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”205
When Bowers temporarily seemed to foreclose a privacy strategy, movement
attorneys began experimenting more vigorously with alternatives.206 While
continuing to push privacy arguments in state court, movement lawyers began
putting more emphasis on claims that sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, much like race.207
These arguments gained attention in 1992, when the Supreme Court heard
Romer v. Evans, a case involving the constitutionality of Colorado’s Amendment
Two.208 That measure prohibited any local government from passing
antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians.209 In its amicus brief,
Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a major movement organization formed in the
early 1980s, argued that the Court would not have to address whether sexual

199. On the emphasis on privacy arguments, see, for example, MEZEY, supra note 86, at 230;
ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 32 (2009).
200. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
201. Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project et al. at 3, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140).
202. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
203. Brief for Respondent at 12, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140).
204. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–205.
205. Id. at 194.
206. On litigation strategy after Bowers, see, for example, ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 120–26;
ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 329–48, 422–57.
207. See, e.g., RON BECKER, GAY TV AND STRAIGHT AMERICA 65–74 (2006).
208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1992).
209. COLO. CONST. art. II, §30, subsec. b.
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orientation was suspect to strike down Amendment Two.210 However, the group
maintained that sexual orientation should qualify as a suspect classification.211
HRC recognized that the crucial problem was the requirement that a trait be
immutable.212 The group insisted that immutable-trait analysis “revolves around
the concept of ‘lack of responsibility’ and relates to the premise that it is unfair to
penalize an individual for a characteristic over which the individual has had no
responsibility in acquiring.”213 According to HRC, sexual orientation was just
such a characteristic.214
As many predicted, Romer did not conclude that sexual orientation was a
suspect classification, but the Court still held that Amendment Two failed
rational basis review and struck it down.215 After Romer, equal protection
reasoning raised the stakes of proving sexual orientation to be a suspect
classification. Indeed, when developing a new challenge to sodomy bans, some
activists believed that the movement should focus exclusively on equality
reasoning.216 Ultimately, in 2003, activists used both privacy and equality
arguments in litigating Lawrence v. Texas.217 This strategy seemed to pay off when
a majority struck down the Texas sodomy ban.218 Rhetorically, Lawrence invoked
the ideas of both liberty and equality but left open questions about the precise
doctrinal foundation and scope of the Court’s ruling.219 After Lawrence,
demonstrating that sexual orientation was a suspect classification remained a
movement priority.220
At the same time that the outcome of equal-protection litigation seemed to
depend on whether sexual orientation was immutable, popular support seemed
to be influenced by the same considerations. Between 1977 and 2012, Gallup
polls asked respondents both if they believed sexual orientation was immutable
and if they favored equality for gays and lesbians.221 Roughly two-thirds of those
210. See Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 21, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Brief of the HRCF]. Other major
movement groups concluded that the Court would not yet recognize sexual orientation as a suspect
classification and did not press this claim; instead, organizations like the ACLU contended that
Amendment 2 failed even rational basis review. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 282–84;
ESKRIDGE, supra note 97 at 208.
211. See Brief of the HRCF, supra note 210, at 21.
212. See, e.g., id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., id.
215. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–36.
216. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 127.
217. See, e.g., id. at 127–35.
218. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
219. On the connection between liberty and equality in Lawrence, see, for example, Laurence H.
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893, 1898 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1458–59
(2004); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 97–100 (2003); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 863 (2014) (“As many scholars have noted, Lawrence was a constitutional
hybrid, drawing on both strands of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.”).
220. See ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 127–35.
221. See, e.g., JOHN R. HIBBING, KEVIN B. SMITH & JOHN R. ALFORD, PREDISPOSED: LIBERALS,
CONSERVATIVES, AND THE BIOLOGY OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES 253 (2014).
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who believed that homosexuality was a lifestyle choice viewed gay lifestyles as
unacceptable.222 By contrast, more than three-quarters of those who thought
sexual orientation was immutable found gay lifestyles acceptable.223
As marriage equality made its way into federal court, the use of clashing
definitions of sexual orientation signaled deeper disagreement about the
legitimacy of marriage equality. Whereas conservative groups continued to insist
that homosexuality was an illegitimate preference, GLBTQ groups and their
allies maintained that sexual orientation was immutable.224 In 2013-2014, GLBTQ
litigators challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a state constitutional
ban on marriage equality, and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a
law denying federal benefits and recognition to married same-sex couples.
Liberty Counsel, a leading socially conservative public interest group, used
sexual-preference arguments in defending same-sex marriage bans.
Manipulating psychiatric evidence, the group stressed how much sexual identity
could change.225 Because sexuality was chosen, Liberty Counsel argued, sexual
orientation could not be a suspect classification.226 “If homosexuality is properly
understood as a behavior or lifestyle choice, and is well-recognized as fluid and
developing,” the group argued, “then certainly it cannot be said to be
immutable.”227
A year later in Obergefell v. Hodges, the American Psychological Association
(APA) and other allied groups supporting marriage equality argued that
homosexuality was “normal, generally not chosen, and [. . .] highly resistant to
change.”228 GLMA, a gay-rights health advocacy group, agreed: “All credible
study of sexual orientation establishes that genetic, hereditary and biological
influences are major factors in determining sexual orientation.”229 So did leading
constitutional scholars, who maintained that “[g]ay and lesbian individuals share
a common ‘immutable’ characteristic, both because sexual orientation is
fundamental to their identity, [. . .] and because one’s sexual orientation is not
changeable through conscious decision, therapeutic intervention, or any other
method.”230 By contrast, some socially conservative amici in Obergefell even
refused to use the language of sexual orientation, referring to homosexuality as a
“sexual preference.”231
222. See, e.g., id.
223. See, e.g., id.
224. See infra Part II.
225. See Brief of Amici Liberty Counsel, Inc. and Campaign for Children and Families in Support
of Petitioners at 35, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
226. See id. at 35–36.
227. Id.
228. Brief of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) [hereinafter Brief of the
APA].
229. Brief of Amicus Curiae GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellees and In Support of Affirmance at 4, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14562, 14-571, 14-574).
230. Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Ashutosh Bhagwat et al., Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 9, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
231. See, e.g., Brief for the National Coalition of Black Pastors and Christian Leaders as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574)
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The language of sexual orientation has become a cornerstone of progressive
arguments for GLBTQ equality—a way of maximizing support for the cause and
strengthening equal-protection arguments in the courts. By contrast, those
skeptical of the GLBTQ movement draw on the language of sexual preference to
challenge both legal and political demands for equal treatment. This political
alignment now seems natural, but the politics and law of defining sexuality have
changed significantly over time. In the 1970s, leading activists stayed away from
the rhetoric of sexual orientation. Groups at the state and federal level argued
that orientation-based definitions offered too little protection. Only after the
AIDS epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right did arguments about sexual
preference come to seem to be a staple of social conservatism advocacy. By
drawing on this history, Part III next evaluates the definition of sexuality at work
in Obergefell itself.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN OBERGEFELL
Although Obergefell revolutionized access to marriage for gays and lesbians,
Justice Kennedy’s majority says surprisingly little about sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, a close reading of both the majority and dissents in Obergefell
reveals that the Court increasingly treats orientation as clearly identifiable,
binary, and unchangeable.
Kennedy first discusses the nature of orientation in relating the history of
gays and lesbians in the United States.232 In describing the rise of sodomy bans,
Obergefell explains that other Americans did not “deem homosexuals to have
dignity in their own distinct identity.”233 At a minimum, the Court suggests that
sexual orientation is not simply a behavior or lifestyle but rather something more
meaningful—a distinct identity.234
Later, after describing the recent history of the GLBTQ movement, Obergefell
describes clearer evidence of how the Court sees sexual orientation.235 “Only in
more recent years,” Kennedy writes, “have psychiatrists and others recognized
that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”236
Here, Obergefell’s definition of sexual orientation is revealing. Kennedy cites
the American Psychological Association (APA)’s definition for support.237 In
amicus briefs in both Windsor and Obergefell, the APA has described sexuality in
the following terms:

(“It is Amici's position that the government should never classify or discriminate against another
human being based on who they are. A person’s sexuality and sexual preferences, however,
are not their state of being, or even an immutable aspect of who they are, as race is. The truth is that
sexual conduct is an activity.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of Leaders of the 2012 Republican National
Convention Committee on the Platform and Others Supporting Respondents at 13, Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
232. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id.
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Sexual orientation refers to an enduring disposition to experience sexual,
affectional, and/or romantic attractions to one or both sexes. It also encompasses
an individual’s sense of personal and social identity based on those attractions,
on behaviors expressing those attractions, and on membership in a community of
others who share those attractions and behaviors. Although sexual orientation
ranges along a continuum from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively
homosexual, it is usually discussed in three categories: heterosexual (having
sexual and romantic attraction primarily or exclusively to members of the other
sex), homosexual (having sexual and romantic attraction primarily or exclusively
to members of one’s own sex), and bisexual (having a significant degree of sexual
and romantic attraction to both sexes).238

Kennedy partly echoes the APA’s description of sexuality. Obergefell
highlights that sexuality is constitutive of individual identity.239 Like the APA,
the Court’s opinion also presents homosexuality and bisexuality as normal.240
However, the majority goes further than the APA in describing sexuality as
immutable.241 The APA defines sexual orientation as enduring and highly
resistant to change.242 However, the organization also emphasizes the diversity
and fluidity of sexual identities, attractions, and relationships—something that
drops out of Obergefell entirely.243 While the opinion is far from clear, the Court
seems to have adopted fairly clean, bright-line binaries to describe sexuality.
Obergefell describes sexual orientation as distinct and immutable but also
largely irrelevant, at least to the question of marriage. While Kennedy borrows
some of the APA’s language about gay and lesbian identity, Obergefell never
hints at the existence of a distinctive culture or community. Instead, in every way
that counts, the gay and lesbian couples described in the opinion resemble their
heterosexual counterparts.244 For example, in analyzing a potential due process
claim, Obergefell emphasizes the ways in which same-sex couples resemble
opposite-sex couples.245 “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring
bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression,
intimacy, and spirituality,” the Court explains.246 “This is true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation.”247 Whatever is distinctive about gays and
lesbians, Kennedy makes clear that it has nothing to do with couples’ ability to
raise loving families or legitimately desire marriage.248
Obergefell leaves many questions unanswered. Kennedy does little to resolve
the standard of scrutiny applied to sexual-orientation classifications.249 While
Obergefell explicitly concludes that same-sex marriage bans in some way violate
238. Brief of the APA, supra note 228, at 7–9 (emphasis in the original).
239. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596, with Brief of the APA, supra note 228, at 7–9.
240. Supra note 239.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
245. See, e.g., id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id at 2599–601 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite- sex couples with
respect to this principle.”).
249. See generally id. at 2596–601.
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both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the decision provides no real
map for lower courts dealing with sexual-orientation classifications.250
Nevertheless, Obergefell suggests that same-sex couples resemble opposite sex
couples in every salient way—indeed, in every way actually discussed by the
majority. The Court also spotlights the harms of treating same-sex couples
differently without reason. “Especially against a long history of disapproval of
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a
grave and continuing harm,” Kennedy writes. “The imposition of this disability
on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”251
In spite of the ambiguity of Obergefell, the Court’s understanding of sexual
orientation differs significantly from the ones used in Justice Roberts and Scalia’s
dissents. Roberts frames his opinion as an attack on the overreach of the Court.252
In describing the goals of same-sex couples, he strikes a more conciliatory note.253
“If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who
favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision,” he
writes.254 It might be telling that Roberts uses the language of sexual orientation,
rather than sexual preference, in spite of the implicit invitation by some
conservative amici to do so.
At other times, however, Roberts at least implies that sexual orientation is
something less than immutable. In criticizing the breadth of the Court’s opinion,
Roberts notes that much of the logic of Obergefell could easily apply to
polyamorous relationships.255 Roberts notes several possible themes uniting the
interests of those in polyamorous and same-sex relationships: a desire to avoid
harming children by denying their parents access to marriage, the constitutional
importance of decisional autonomy, and the importance of dignifying alternative
relationships.256 While acknowledging that there may be distinctions between
same-sex couples and those in polyamorous relationships, Roberts does not say
what the majority treats as obvious. For the majority, same-sex marriage differs
from polyamorous unions because sexual orientation is immutable.257
While an autonomy argument for marriage equality may apply effectively
to polyamorous relationships, an equality argument seems harder to make at
present. Few scholars have argued that the desire to be in a polyamorous
relationship is immutable, although some evidence supports the idea that a
preference for polyamory is at least partly biological.258 For the most part,
250. See id. at 2602–05.
251. Id. at 2604.
252. See id. at 2616 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “indefensible as a matter of
constitutional law”).
253. See id. at 2626.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 2622 (“If not having the opportunity to marry ‘serves to disrespect and
subordinate’ gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn't the same ‘imposition of this disability’ . . . serve
to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?”).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See, e.g., Ann Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1484 (2011)
(summarizing leading views of polyamorous preferences); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 343–45 (2004)
(same).
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contemporary debate treats polyamory as a mere lifestyle preference.259
Comparing polyamorous relationships to those of gay and lesbian couples at
least raises the question of whether Roberts sees sexual orientation as a mere
matter of choice.
Justice Antonin Scalia also described sexuality in ambiguous terms. Like
Roberts, Scalia trained his fire on the majority and its willingness, in his view, to
impose the views of the Court on the public.260 When discussing sexuality itself,
Scalia studiously avoided the language used by the same-sex couples and their
attorneys.261 He wrote dismissively: “The law can recognize as marriage
whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes.”262 For Scalia,
sexuality might not rise to the level of an orientation that cannot be changed.263
Instead, gays and lesbians have only one of several possible “sexual
attachments” that the law could recognize.264
The clues in each opinion notwithstanding, Obergefell leaves many questions
unanswered. The majority avoided announcing a standard of scrutiny or
deeming sexual orientation a suspect classification. Partly for this reason,
litigation of sexual-orientation classifications will likely follow closely after the
Court’s decision. Some of these lawsuits will stem directly from Obergefell itself.
Even the majority foreshadowed the likely suits brought by vendors and other
public accommodations wishing to deny service to same-sex couples or GLBTQ
individuals for reasons of religion or conscience.265 Other suits will likely force
the Court to clarify whether sexual-orientation classifications do in fact warrant
strict scrutiny.
This litigation will require the courts to develop a sharper definition of
sexual orientation. Other scholars have recognized that courts often treat
sexuality as a binary—and with deeply problematic results.266 The history of the
framing of sexuality illuminates some underappreciated costs of this binary.
Drawing on the risks recognized by movement members in the 1970s, Part IV
begins by analyzing these costs. Next, Part IV develops an alternative to reduce
these costs.
IV. PERCEIVED SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Although the Court’s analysis on the issue is far from lucid, the Obergefell
majority seems to describe sexual orientation by reference to immutable, fixed
categories. Nevertheless, after Obergefell, the lower courts will have not only to
clarify the standard of review for sexual-orientation discrimination but also to
plainly define sexual orientation itself. Obergefell included, existing precedent

259. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
260. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 2626–27.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 2607 (“[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, samesex marriage should not be condoned.”).
266. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

Ziegler Macro (Do Not Delete)

4/18/2016 3:30 PM

PERCEIVING ORIENTATION

251

offers no such clear definition. In federal court, this should be no surprise. The
federal courts have not yet established that sexual orientation is a suspect
classification.267 Nor does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 treat sexual
orientation as a protected class.268 By contrast, the state and city-level protections
that first appeared in the 1970s offer some idea of how lawmakers have defined
sexual orientation.
When viewed in historical perspective, these laws shed some light on the
problems with the kind of bright-line definition the Court seems to have
adopted. The first set of problems involves the conduct-status distinction. On one
hand, as activists experienced in the past, protecting a supposedly immutable
status may open the door to justifications for conduct-based discrimination. This
possibility seems very real in the context of public accommodations
discrimination for same-sex couples.
Consider the example of Elane Photography v. Willock. In that case, a
photographer challenged a recent New Mexico statute that banned
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in state court.269 The New
Mexico law defined sexual orientation as “heterosexuality, homosexuality or
bisexuality, whether actual or perceived.”270
The proprietors of Elane
Photography argued, among other things, that the law violated the Free Exercise
Clause.271 As a threshold matter, however, the proprietors argued that they had
not violated the statute at all.272 The owners of Elane Photography claimed that
they objected not to the sexual orientation of same-sex couples but rather to their
conduct—celebrating marriages that ran contrary to the religious beliefs of the
proprietors.273 The owners also maintained that they would refuse to photograph
heterosexual couples endorsing same-sex marriage.274
Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument, but the
lengths the court went to do so makes clear how difficult the status-conduct
distinction might be to overcome in the future. The court identified three reasons
for refusing a distinction between conduct and status. First, the court reasoned:
“The difficulty in distinguishing between status and conduct in the context of
sexual orientation discrimination is that people may base their judgment about
an individual’s sexual orientation on the individual’s conduct.”275
Here, the court compared its case to Lawrence v. Texas, a Supreme Court
decision striking down sodomy bans.276 The Lawrence Court rejected a conduct-

267. See, e.g., Herbert C. Brown, Jr., A Crowded Room or the Perfect Fit? Exploring Affirmative Action
Treatment in College and University Admissions for Self-Identified LGBT Individuals, 21 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 603, 640–50 (2015) (detailing how the courts have stopped short of recognizing sexual
orientation as a suspect classification).
268. See, e.g., Stephanie Rotondo, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Persons, 16 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 103, 112–14 (2015).
269. See Elane Photography L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–59 (N.M. 2013).
270. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(P) (West 2007).
271. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63.
272. See id. at 61–62.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 61.
276. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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status distinction with respect to sodomy bans.277 For the Elane Photography
Court, the connection between status and conduct seemed just as close.278 To
other judges, this may not be obvious. Entering into, appearing to enter into, or
endorsing same-sex marriage bears a much less close relationship to sexual
orientation than would same-sex sexual conduct itself. As the court recognized in
Elane Photography, the New Mexico statute was written in extremely broad
terms.279 A narrower statute may make the conduct-status distinction harder to
overcome.
Second, Elane Photography stressed that the proprietors refused to
photograph any displays of affection between same-sex couples.280 As the court
recognized, the connection between sexual orientation and conduct at issue in
the case was particularly close.281 The proprietors seemed willing to offer services
to GLBTQ customers only so long as they concealed their sexual orientation.282 If
Elane Photography had narrowed its objections—say to photographs of same-sex
marriages—the connection between conduct and status might have been far less
close, and the proprietors’ arguments might have been more compelling.
The history of framing sexuality illuminates another danger tied to the
conduct-status distinction. If a law protects individuals on the basis of actual
status, plaintiffs often struggle to prove that the discriminating party knew of
their orientation. Consider the example of Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera.283 There,
plaintiff, a heterosexual female, began working at the Metropolitan Opera as a
secretary.284 She later moved up in the ranks, becoming an assistant director. She
eventually began working under David Kneuss, a gay man.285 Not long after her
tenure began, however, Brennan was fired, and she believed she had been
targeted because of her sexual orientation.286 She brought suit under a New York
law outlawing sexual-orientation discrimination.287 As part of her case, Brennan
pointed out that RG, whom she identified as a gay man, had been hired to
replace her.288
The Brennan Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff could not make
out the elements of her prima facie case because she could not prove that Kneuss
knew either that Brennan was straight or that RG was gay.289 Identifying sexual
orientation might not be a problem in cases like Elane Photography involving
277. Id. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
278. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62–63.
279. See id. at 61.
280. See id. (stating that the owners “testified that they would also have refused to take photos of
same-sex couples in other contexts, including photos of a couple holding hands or showing affection
for each other.”).
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999).
284. See id. at 313–16.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 317–18.
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displays of commitment or affection. In other settings, like employment,
recognizing sexual orientation may be problematic. This would be especially
tricky in cases involving those with fluid identities, like bisexuals and others who
do not see their orientation as fixed over time.
The history of framing sexuality highlights the problems involved not only
in proving “authentic” sexuality but also the probability of orientation-based
stereotyping. Because individual sexuality does not conform to the limited,
clearly defined categories often embraced by courts, individuals may face
discrimination because of their perceived, rather than actual, identity. Much as
the courts do, many individuals assume those around them are either gay or
straight. This categorization may affect those who do not fit into the neat binary,
as well as misidentify non-gender conforming individuals. People make
judgments about sexual orientation based on a variety of cues, including body
motion, dress and hairstyle, behavior, and relationship status, and some of these
judgments are inaccurate.290 As a result, discriminators victimize some
individuals not because of sexual conduct or identity but because of the
stereotypes surrounding sexual orientation.
Washington state law illustrates the problem with false positives of this
kind. In Davis v. Fred’s Appliance, the plaintiff worked as a delivery truck driver
for a Spokane appliance store.291 Although the plaintiff identified as a
heterosexual, a local store supervisor began repeatedly calling plaintiff “Big Gay
Al,” a prominent gay television character.292 The supervisor knew nothing of
plaintiff’s personal life but appeared to react to plaintiff’s personality and
appearance.293 Plaintiff repeatedly asked the supervisor to stop, but when he
persisted, plaintiff exploded and was ultimately terminated.294
Washington law banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
defined as “heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender expression
or identity.”295 The law further defined gender expression as “having or being
perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or
expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance,
behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex
assigned to that person at birth.”296 Plaintiff argued that the law protected
against discrimination on the basis of real and perceived sexual orientation.297
The court rejected this argument.298 Because the statute specifically mentioned
perceived identity with respect to gender identity, the court reasoned that the
omission of perceived sexual orientation was deliberate, and plaintiff’s claim
failed.299
False positives like those in Fred’s Appliance seem likely to impact a broad
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See infra Part IV.
Davis v. Fred’s Appliance, Inc., 287 P.3d 51, 54 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
See id.
See id.
See id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 2009).
Id.
See Fred’s Appliance, 287 P.3d at 57.
See id. at 57–58.
See id.
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group of people. Those affected by sex stereotyping might be targeted because of
sexual-orientation stereotyping. So too might those who do not identify with one
of the clean categories adopted in statutes and by the courts.
A. Toward a Solution
Other scholars have recognized some of these problems and responded
with new approaches to defining sexual orientation. Commentators like Kenji
Yoshino, Naomi Mezey, Ruth Colker, and Elizabeth Glazer have all criticized the
gay-straight binary many use to describe sexuality.300 Yoshino criticizes the
neglect of bisexuality and develops his own analysis of it.301 He defines
bisexuality by reference to desire, conduct, and self-identification.302 For Yoshino,
bisexuals experience discrimination partly because law, politics, and culture have
erased them from the conversation.303 By developing a more robust definition of
bisexuality and foregrounding the issue of bisexual erasure, Yoshino suggests
fundamental changes to existing doctrine, particularly in the area of sexual
harassment.304 More radically, he proposes that “bisexuality’s destabilizing force
may be a powerful means of contesting” the authority of government to regulate
sexuality.305
Rather than developing a new category, Naomi Mezey emphasizes the
downsides of status-based definitions of sexual orientation.306 She argues that
“the social and rhetorical categories of heterosexual and homosexual fail even
remotely to approximate the actual range of human sexual activity, let alone
human sexual desire.”307 Moreover, she argues that status-based categories have
become “definitionally and doctrinally incoherent.”308 As an alternative, Mezey
argues for protections based primarily on sexual behavior—protections that she
believes would more accurately reflect human sexuality and offer help to a
broader group.309 Mezey rejects any solution based on the creation of a new
category insofar as “bisexuality works no better than the other two categories in
accurately describing concrete sexual behavior, and that a new conceptualization
of sexual identities, such as one based on acts, is needed.”310
By contrast, Ruth Colker contends that the problem lies not in the existence
of categories but in their current application.311 Colker urges the adoption of a
third, “bi” category that “reject[s] conventional bipolar categories in the areas of

300. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
301. See generally Yoshino, supra note 4.
302. See id.at 371–77, 380–85.
303. See id. at 361–62 (arguing that “[bisexual] erasure occurs because the two dominant sexual
orientation groups—self-identified straights and self-identified gays—have shared investments in
that erasure”).
304. See id. at 440–60.
305. Id. at 461.
306. See Mezey, supra note 4, at 99–104.
307. Id. at 101.
308. Id. at 132.
309. See id. at 99.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at 15–38; see also Colker, Bi, supra note 4, at 1–3 .
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gender, race, and disability.”312 She focuses on the unique harms tied to binaries
rather than to categories.313 Binary thinking not only renders invisible but also
stigmatizes those with more fluid identities.314 Nonetheless, Colker argues for the
creation of a new category that would “broaden people’s understanding of
identity” and facilitate the introduction of civil-rights protections.315 “We have to
define who is ‘gay, lesbian or bisexual,’” Colker writes, “if we are to create
nondiscrimination statutes, same-sex partner registration, or affirmative
action.”316
More recently, Elizabeth Glazer has proposed a different solution. Glazer
breaks sexual orientation down into two sub-categories, general and specific
orientation.317 General orientation describes “the sex toward which the
individual is attracted as a general matter.”318 Specific orientation involves “the
sex of the individual’s chosen partner.”319 In many cases the two orientations are
identical, but for many bisexuals, the two differ.320
To explain how her approach would work, Glazer draws an analogy to the
sex-stereotyping theory derived from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case holding
that plaintiffs could prove sex discrimination under Title VII when they were
victimized by sex stereotyping.321 Glazer argues that the law can protect
orientation nonconformity much as it protects gender nonconformity under Price
Waterhouse.322 Glazer’s approach would prohibit discrimination against an
individual because her specific orientation differs from her general orientation.323
She predicts that doing so will offer several advantages not available
through other efforts to redefine sexuality.324 First, Glazer emphasizes the
necessity of naming.325 While other scholars focus on the downsides of
categorization, Glazer contends that “naming is the first step toward making
visible those who are not, and making people visible is arguably the first step in
securing for them civil rights.”326 Second, Glazer argues that because binary
definitions of sexual orientation are so entrenched, focusing on orientation
nonconformity will be more effective than strategies dependent on undermining
established categories.327 Finally, Glazer hopes that her illumination of specific
orientation will better reflect the lived experience of those with fluid identities

312. COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at 15.
313. See, e.g., id.
314. See id. at 15–26.
315. Id. at 26–32.
316. Id. at 32.
317. See Glazer, supra note 4, at 1002.
318. See, e.g., id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
322. See Glazer, supra note 4, at 1052–58.
323. Id. at 1054–59.
324. See id. at 1059–66.
325. See id. at 1059–62.
326. Id. at 1059 (quoting Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning
from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1534 (2006)).
327. See id. at 1064–65.
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and behaviors.328
Each approach acknowledges the inaccuracy of binary categories and adds a
new dimension to existing ideas about sexual orientation. Drawing on the history
of debates about sexuality, this Article advocates for a different approach—one
that would protect against discrimination on the basis of perceived or actual
sexual orientation. The laws of some states and localities already include such
protections, and they deserve serious consideration elsewhere.
Like Glazer or Mezey’s proposals, a perceived-identity approach will not
easily fall prey to the conduct-status distinction. Glazer notes that by recognizing
general and specific orientation, the law would make it harder for those like the
owners of Elane Photography to justify conduct-based discrimination. So too
would a perceived-orientation approach. Conduct seems to be one of the major
reasons an individual would face perceived-orientation discrimination. Recall
the men holding hands in the Minnesota bar mentioned by Bruce Voeller in the
1970s. By separating status and conduct, local officials claimed the authority to
target people on the basis of conduct. A perceived-orientation approach would
prevent this. Discriminators would likely target the men Voeller described
because they were perceived to be gay. By including hypothetical, as well as
actual identity, perceived-identity strategies would protect those singled out
because of their conduct.
Weaving this support into common law and constitutional jurisprudence
offers unique advantages. Perceived-identity approaches are already familiar to
many judges under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).329 The
ADA defines a disability as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; (2) a record of such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.330 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has set out several ways to prove
that an individual is regarded as disabled.331 First, a defendant may regard an
individual as disabled if she has a real impairment that does not substantially
limit her ability to function so long as the defendant believes the impairment to
be substantially limiting.332 Second, someone may be regarded as disabled when
her condition is limiting only because of the fears surrounding it.333 Finally, an
individual may be regarded as disabled even if she has no impairment
whatsoever so long as the defendant does not believe that to be the case.334
The logic of regarded-as approaches would easily extend to sexual
328. See id. at 1065–68.
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The EEOC also advocates for regarded-as theories under Title VII,
and in some circuits, regarded-as theories may apply in this context. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 13II(B) (2002); Employment Discrimination
Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of Origin,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm (last visited June 27, 2014). For a sample of
cases on the subject, see, for example, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. WC&M Enter. Inc., 496
F.3d 393, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2007); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012).
330. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
331. See EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). RE Note to Christine: I think R14.2(a) allows for the title to
be included, so I wrote it back in.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
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orientation. In some states, perceived-as approaches already apply.335 Elsewhere,
courts interpreting state and federal disability laws are already familiar with
regarded-as approaches.336 Importing similar reasoning into sexual-orientation
law will require less of judges than the recognition of a new sexual-orientation
category.
Moreover, a perceived-identity approach can work without requiring
judges and policymakers to cast aside established ideas about sexuality.
Perceived-identity approaches like the ones at work in New Mexico assume that
some persons, or even many, fall into the conventional gay or straight
paradigm.337 These categories resonate deeply, even with those aware of their
shortcomings.338 Statutes focused on perceived discrimination do not require
legislators or judges to think beyond the gay-straight binary. Indeed, by focusing
on perception, such an approach recognizes that discriminators will often
mistakenly identify a victim as either gay or straight. Perceived-identity
approaches recognize this reality while acknowledging that individual
experience can be far more fluid.
At least under certain circumstances, a perceived-orientation approach also
seems likely to offer more protection than the strategies described by Glazer,
Yoshino, Mezey, and Colker. Colker and Yoshino develop bisexual categories
that protect those whose desires deviate from the heterosexual-homosexual
paradigm.339 Mezey prefers to protect anyone whose conduct triggers
discrimination.340 Finally, Glazer sets out two dimensions of identity and uses
them to protect those singled out for orientation nonconformity.341
All of these approaches promise some protection to those who do not fit the
gay-straight binary. However, each leaves out some of those about whom
activists worried during the 1970s. First, by offering protection on the basis of
some combination of conduct, self-identification, and desire, no approach
explicitly addresses orientation-based stereotypes. Individuals like the delivery
driver in Fred’s Appliance suffer on the job not because of their lived sexual
experience but rather because of orientation stereotyping. As the federal courts
have recognized in the Title VII context, discriminators often conflate sexualorientation and sex stereotyping.342 Perceived-orientation approaches recognize
335. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-1-1 to -13 (West 1978); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107.
336. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -13 (West 1978) (defining sexual orientation as
“heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2 (West 1953) (defining sexual
orientation as “an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, or
bisexual”).
337. See supra notes 329–30 and text accompanying.
338. See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at xiii (“[C]ategorization under the law . . . is
inevitable.”); Yoshino, supra note 4, at 391, 461 (“[B]isexuals remain invisible because both selfidentified straights and self-identified gays have overlapping political interests in bisexual erasure.”);
Glazer, supra note 4, at 1064 (“Our current vocabulary cannot save even the most well-intentioned
individual from the trap of the heterosexual/homosexual binary.”).
339. See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at 15, 86; Yoshino, supra note 4, at 459–61.
340. See, e.g., Mezey, supra note 4, at 126–32.
341. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 4, at 1059–68.
342. See, e.g., Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 715, 764 (2014) (analyzing cases to show that “[p]laintiffs who ‘look gay’ succeed under Title VII
while those merely known or thought to be gay do not”); Rotondo, supra note 268, at 107 (“LGBT
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this reality and offer a potential solution to it.
It is worth exploring why an approach that focuses partly on sexual
conduct, like Mezey or Glazer’s, would not capture all of the discrimination
covered by a perceived-orientation approach. As Mezey and Glazer envision,
individuals deserve protection from discrimination based partly on specific
sexual relationships—not just their general preference for one group of
individuals or another. Mezey highlights the importance of stigma associated not
only with “erotic and sexual desires [but] also about sexual acts.”343 For victims
like those in Fred’s Appliance, however, the problem is not sexual conduct.
Instead, in these cases, discriminators fall back on generalizations about the
mannerisms, dress, appearance, or behavior associated with a specific sexual
orientation. Often correlated with gender nonconformity, these stereotypes do
not always track an individual’s romantic or sexual behavior, either in public or
in private.
Nor would Glazer’s protection of specific orientation necessarily reach
plaintiffs like those in Fred’s Appliance. Glazer separates general orientation—an
individual’s typical preference or type—from specific orientation, an individual’s
desire for or relationship with a particular partner.344 As Glazer explains, some
individuals face discrimination not because of their general orientation but
because of incidents tied to their specific orientation. As she explains, “bisexual
discrimination can be understood as discrimination on the basis of an
individual’s conduct (for example, sleeping with a member of the same sex)
failing to conform to an individual’s status (for example, heterosexual).”345
Glazer would outlaw discrimination against those who sexual conduct deviates
from their general orientation or identity.346
Like Mezey’s strategy, Glazer’s method would protect the sexual behavior
of those who do not fit comfortably within the standard categories used to define
sexual orientation. However, like Mezey, Glazer also focuses on discrimination
based partly on sexual conduct. As Voeller and his colleagues understood in the
1970s, orientation-based discrimination often involves biases triggered not by
sexual behavior but rather by what an individual does in public. Displays of
affection may trigger orientation-based stereotyping, but so too may a variety of
more subtle cues, including a plaintiff’s lack of a known same-sex significant
other347 or gender non-conformity.348 Sexual-orientation discrimination harms
plaintiffs have found success by building upon the sex stereotyping theories of discrimination
articulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.”).
343. Mezey, supra note 4, at 126.
344. See Glazer, supra note 4, at 1054–58.
345. Id. at 1057.
346. See id. at 1055–59.
347. Several same-sex sexual harassment cases involve individuals targeted for not taking of
advantage of sexual opportunities with opposite sex partners. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F.
Supp. 1452, 1452–56 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving discriminator targeting plaintiff because of his lack of a
wife or girlfriend); Mowery v. Escambia Cty. Util. Auth., 2006 WL 327965, at *4 (N.D. Fl. 2006)
(involving discriminators stereotyping victim because of his age, economic status, and lack of an
opposite-sex partner); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving
plaintiff who was targeted because he did not have sex with a female friend).
348. See, e.g., Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 (describing harassment plaintiff suffered because he carried
a tray “like a woman”); Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 568, 576–77 (7th Cir.
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victims for reasons unrelated to private sexual behavior, and a perceivedorientation approach promises to remedy some of these injuries.
Scholars who seek to create a new bisexual category face different problems.
Yoshino and Colker each define bisexuality in compelling ways. However,
neither addresses how a plaintiff would prove her actual orientation. The
example of Title VII litigation helps to illustrate this point. Under Title VII, to
prove a disparate treatment claim based on actual orientation, a victim would
have to establish first that she belonged to a protected class.349 For individuals
whose conduct does not fit within classic, binary categories of sexual orientation,
this requirement may prove fatal to a claim.
In either a direct or indirect disparate treatment claim, plaintiffs may also
have difficulty finding circumstantial evidence to establish that the employer
acted because of their orientation. In direct disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff
may prevail if she establishes direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination,
including evidence that those not in the protected class systematically received
better treatment or that plaintiff lost an opportunity to someone not in the
protected class.350 In indirect disparate treatment cases, after the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case, she can rebut the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory justification using statistical evidence, direct evidence of
discrimination, or proof that an individual outside of the protected class but
otherwise similar to the plaintiff received better treatment.351
In either direct or indirect cases, evidence of this kind may be as hard to
come by as it was for the plaintiff in Brennan. Unlike race or sex, sexual
orientation is not always visible or publicly known.352 Plaintiffs may struggle to
prove, as in Brennan, that a discriminator knew of their true orientation,
particularly when a victim does not fit within the gay-straight binary. Nor, given
that sexual conduct and identity are often kept private, will plaintiffs easily
identify comparators or compile statistical evidence. If the law reached perceived
discrimination, plaintiffs would be relieved of the burden of proving the real
orientation of potential comparators or the employer’s larger workforce.
Moreover, new categories may not effectively protect those victimized by
orientation stereotyping. Symbolically, protecting only “true” orientation sends
the message that negative stereotypes tied to particular behaviors or identities
are not deeply problematic in and of themselves. Perceived-orientation
approaches help ameliorate this concern by asking courts to focus on what
discriminators believe rather than to which category an individual belongs.

1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (describing harassment plaintiff suffered because he wore an
earring and did not conform to gender expectations).
349. See, e.g., Jackson v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 789 F.3d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 2015).
350. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Am.
Hosp. Ass’n., 157 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 1998).
351. See, e.g., Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 977 (1987); BARBARA T. LINDEMANN , PAUL GROSSMAN & PAUL W. CANE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 27 (3d ed. 1996).
352. See, e.g., Definition of Terms, BERKELEY GENDER EQUITY RESEARCH CENTER,
http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt_resources_definiton_of_terms#invisible_minority (last visited Feb.
18, 2016) (defining an “invisible minority” as a “group whose minority status is not always
immediately visible, such as some disabled people and LGBTIQ people”).
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Finally, perceived-orientation approaches allow for additional protection
without adding another category. Scholars have documented the problems with
sexual-orientation categories. Quite simply, such categories often leave a group
of people without protection, much as the gay-straight binary left out many with
more fluid identities. A perceived-orientation approach avoids the exclusion
inevitably involved in categorization.
To be sure, a perceived-orientation approach will not solve every problem
tied to sexual-identity discrimination jurisprudence. As Title VII and ADA
jurisprudence makes clear, plaintiffs often struggle to prove the intent of a
discriminator in taking a particular act.353 A perceived-orientation approach
would require victims to offer some proof of what a discriminator is thinking,
and this will often prove to be no easy task. At the same time, an approach
focused on perceived orientation captures the reality that individuals face
orientation-based discrimination for a variety of reasons, including but not
limited to conduct.
CONCLUSION
To the extent Obergefell defines sexual orientation, the Court has divided
along conventional political lines. By defining sexual orientation as normal and
immutable, the majority echoes the position taken by GLBTQ groups. To the
extent that Justice Roberts and Scalia cast doubt on the immutability of sexual
orientation, their dissents took up ideas used by religious conservatives and
other opponents of same-sex marriage.
As Obergefell exemplifies, the contemporary politics of orientation have
become so familiar that they seem inevitable. History shows instead that the
current alignment is recent—the product of several decades of political and
social change. In the mid-1970s, as psychiatrists stopped defining homosexuality
as an illness, mental-health professionals and GLBTQ activists debated how
sexuality should be redefined. Within local, state, and national organizations, the
issue divided activists. While some preferred the language of sexual orientation
and effectively advocated for civil-rights ordinances that used that rhetoric, most
movement leaders ultimately settled on the definition proposed by Jack Baker
and his allies in Minnesota—one based on sexual or affectional preference.
A preference-based definition gained support for both practical and
ideological reasons. As a matter of principle, lesbian feminists favored language
that expressed faith in the legitimacy of homosexuality and pride in GLBTQ
identity. As a practical matter, movement leaders believed that preference-based
definitions would offer more protection, particularly for those targeted because
of conduct and orientation stereotyping.
Later, when preference-based definitions lost influence, movement leaders
responded to a hostile new political climate. As the Religious Right and New
Right mobilized, conservative evangelicals refined arguments describing
sexuality as a preference. At first, such arguments served primarily to undermine
353. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and the ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 215 (1993) (“[U]nder the
disparate treatment theory must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate, and intent is
generally difficult to prove absent a smoking gun.”) (emphasis in the original).
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demands for civil-rights protections. If homosexuality was nothing more than a
preference, as the argument went, then creating civil-rights protections would
represent an unfair form of special treatment for GLBTQ individuals. After the
start of the AIDS epidemic, preference arguments also exploited public fear of
the disease.
As preference-based definitions became a political liability, groups like the
NGLTF and GRNL stopped emphasizing them. By the 1990s, the language of
sexual orientation had become legally as well as politically advantageous. When
Bowers seemingly foreclosed privacy arguments, movement attorneys channeled
more energy into equal-protection strategies, gradually building the case that
sexual orientation was a suspect classification. This history is relevant to the
challenge courts face in defining sexual orientation. Any solution deserving
support should address all of the problems identified during the debates of the
1970s.
This Article proposed a perceived-orientation approach as a way of
resolving some of the issues raised by activists in the 1970s. Laws that reach
perceived orientation should guard against discrimination on the basis of
conduct rather than status. Such an approach would protect those with fluid
identities without requiring the courts to adopt a novel jurisprudential approach
or think beyond an ingrained gay-straight binary. Moreover, perceived-identity
laws would provide crucial protection for those victimized by orientation-based
stereotyping. Re-conceptualizing sexual orientation would thus offer a valuable
opportunity for courts and legislatures to explore the ways in which sexualorientation discrimination, like sex discrimination, harms not only outsider
groups but also the larger community.

